How GDP destroyed Greek democracy, and may do the same to the Eurozone

March, 2016

The “Beyond-GDP” debate is a curious phenomenon. At the highest levels of governance it is widely recognised that GDP is a poor measure of socio-economic progress. The U.N., the E.U., the OECD and the IMF have all expressed this view, as have many national political leaders. At political “street-level”, however, this issue hardly registers. It may seem too technical, or people may simply believe that GDP is non-political – an absolute statistic that cannot be changed.

In other words, the people who could change a system they know to be broken do not do so because  it will garner no votes. Instead, they muse about supplementary “wellbeing” indicators, while making reassuring noises about GDP being only one in a range of measures that policy-makers use.

That is true, up to a point. Even in the financial markets the statistics on employment, wages, inflation, productivity, exchange rates and trade are closely watched. National governments and supra-national organisations monitor human health, the environment, poverty, inequality, employment and, in some cases, the wellbeing or “happiness” of their populations. These are the five most important indicators, as identified by the New Economics Foundation in their recent report.

Ultimately, however, the importance of each measure lies in its influence – its capacity to make things happen or prevent them from happening. If, for example, a rise in obesity automatically triggers a rise in the tax on sugar, then the level of obesity in a population becomes an influential measure (which at present it is not). Similarly, if rising inequality were to lead directly to higher taxes on money-wealth, then the number that measures inequality would soon become among the most closely watched.

GDP is influential for many reasons, but that influence is most explicit in the rules that govern the European Union and, in particular, the Eurozone. GDP is embedded in the European treaties, where it dictates not only the pecking order of the member states but also their capacity to borrow money.

Specifically, the treaties say that a member state’s annual budget deficit should be no more than 3% of GDP, and that total government debt should be no more than 60%. Following the 2008 crash, the latter figure escalated across most member states, rising above 90% for the Eurozone as a whole and to nearly twice that level in Greece. The annual deficit peaked at about 6.5% for the Eurozone (in 2010) while in Greece it exceeded 15% in 2009.

Once incurred, even a strict application of the treaty rules cannot manage away the accumulated debt quickly. But it can control the budget deficit, which in Greece fell from its 2009 peak to 3.6% in 2014 under extreme pressure from the Eurozone directorate. The tax increases and deep cuts to pensions, benefits, public services and social investment required to achieve this traumatised the Greek economy and people, leading directly to the political crisis that brought Syriza to power in January 2015.

Many commentators observed that these austerity measures were self-defeating – that if an economy could not access funding to invest it could not hope to grow out of its decline. Less clearly noted, however, was the way that the debt-to-GDP rules contributed to this. Greece’s GDP fell 27% between 2008 and 2014, while government debt rose a net 20% in the same period. The ratio of debt to GDP, however, rose by 63%, spooking the financial markets and driving up borrowing costs. The level of  permitted borrowing fell proportionately each year, for the same reason.

From a Eurozone governance perspective this outcome, however regrettable at a human level, is a necessary consequence of past overspending. Greece is reaping what she has sown, and must learn the error of her profligate ways. Enforcement, however, is only a good idea if the rules are the right ones. The effect of the Eurozone’s rules has been to cause a feedback loop in which falling GDP creates the conditions in which it falls still further – a cycle of decline that has still not been halted in 2016.

The problem arises because the Eurozone assumes that the size of a country’s GDP is a reliable measure of its wealth and, therefore, of the amount it can afford to borrow. But GDP is a highly selective measure, which tends to exaggerate both the rises and the falls in production, thereby contributing to a cycle of boom and bust. It does this because it measures only payments of money, and not the losses or benefits that arise from them.

During the construction boom in Greece (and elsewhere), GDP accelerated in response to the cement being purchased, the architects’ fees being paid and the construction workers receiving their wages. Those new apartments and hotels, however, add no real value until they are lived in and enjoyed. For the many “unperforming” projects – those that were not completed or not wanted when the boom ended – the work and materials that went into them was effectively valueless – indeed they may have subtracted value by leaving ugly scars on the valuable natural landscape.

This is one example among many of how GDP measures financial activity without considering its value or usefulness. Because, in boom times, activity is high, GDP runs ahead of real value. It favours speculation because it counts all the money that the speculators spend. When the boom ends, however, and the speculative money ceases to flow, GDP has nothing to sustain it.

What happens then? Typically an adjustment takes place, involving lower wages, unemployment and businesses going bust. Demand falls, but so do interest rates and asset prices, so after a while the system starts to right itself and returns to some sort of growth. Inflation and currency depreciation may play a part, reducing the real cost of servicing locally denominated debt and making exports more competitive.

For Greece, as a member of the Eurozone, the failing businesses and unemployment were all too evident, but the policy tools that could assist with the adjustment were not available. The levers of interest rates, inflation and exchange rates are all in the hands of the European Central Bank, whose one-size-fits-all approach cannot accommodate the needs of an outlier case.

For many Greeks, as for many Spaniards and others, the formal economy simply ceased to operate as the collapse occurred. Unemployment in Greece rose from 7.8% in 2008 to 26.5% in 2014, leaving a quarter of the population unable to participate. Many fell back on the informal economy, particularly the support systems of families and communities that do not depend upon circulating cash.

The informal economy does not register in GDP. If people return to their family homes, no account is taken of the value created by making use of rooms that were previously empty. If they grow and cook their own food, the GDP needle does not flicker. If they brew their own coffee, rather than buying it in bars and coffee shops, GDP registers the purchase of coffee beans but not the substantial retail margin. If they gather wood for heat, rather than burn oil; if they look after their own children rather than pay for a child-minder; if they repair their house rather than employ a builder; indeed, if they do anything for themselves that could alternatively be paid for, GDP simply shrugs its shoulders and looks the other way. People with time on their hands and a shortage of money soon learn ways to create value, but GDP isn’t interested. Informal networks of sharing, recycling, and even trading in second hand goods provide valuable, productive opportunities without ever troubling the GDP statisticians.

In the money economy, if prices fall, GDP falls with them, even if the useful value of the item remains the same. A carrot is a carrot, after all: it contains the same nutrients irrespective of what you pay for it. Lower rents, reflecting falling asset prices, reduce GDP despite the fact that making housing more affordable is an economic boon. In a recession, speculative activity such as stock market and currency trading also declines, which depresses GDP but doesn’t remove anything of real, productive value. Like many professional services, the trade in financial securities is designed to shift wealth from one person to another, not to create anything new.

Overall, the collapse in GDP that occurs when the financial cycle turns boom to bust, while causing real hardship to many of the most vulnerable people, takes more value out of the unproductive, transactional economy than it takes from the part of the economy that provides people with what they need to live. It also causes a transfer of economic activity away from money transactions and into the informal arrangements that GDP does not measure. Looked at in this light, GDP is revealed as profoundly undemocratic, because the conditions that it favours (high prices, easy credit, low corporate and capital taxes, generous investor returns) themselves favour a relatively small, already-wealthy elite. 

The interests of the wider population, on the other hand, (affordable housing, equitable working conditions, high quality public services and good physical and mental health) are poorly reflected in GDP, which takes no account of how effectively wealth is distributed. Meanwhile, the most democratic expression of economic power, which is the work that people do freely for themselves and others, is completely ignored by the GDP measure.

GDP is doubly dangerous in its governance impacts. It forces societies to overspend in bubbles that have little or no value for social progress. This makes them more prone to economic instabilities, which often cause bursts and crises (e.g. this has been the case with the GDP-driven real-estate crisis in the US, which led to the 2008 financial collapse, as well as with the current ‘triple bubble’ in China). When the bubble bursts, then GDP-based parameters tie the hands of democratically elected governments, sinking societies into a downward spiral.

In 2015 the Greek people voted consistently to reject the austerity being forced upon them. They twice returned to power a party that was fundamentally opposed to the austerity model, but that government was then obliged by its Eurozone partners to choose between this overwhelming democratic mandate and the continued use of the country’s established currency. In the Eurozone governance narrative, the popular resistance to austerity was merely a question of a recalcitrant patient not liking her medicine. From a Greek perspective, however, that political mandate reflected a much deeper reality – that the governance framework is too inflexible to meet the fiscal needs of a diverse continent, in which different local, regional and national economies have different characters.

Much has been made of the divisions between north and south in Europe. Often this takes the form of a crude comparison between a “protestant” (hard work) ethic in the industrialised north and a “mañana” attitude in countries bordering the Mediterranean. Sometimes, however, the approach is more intelligent, observing real differences, which should be taken seriously. For example, many north Europeans like to visit the Mediterranean for their holidays. They appreciate, presumably, the sunshine, the landscape, the beaches with their warm water and the general ambience and culture, which differs from their home experience.

In general, these attractions are free, in money terms, but the fact that people are willing to spend significant sums on travel, accommodation, etc., to access them suggests that they do have real value, of which GDP takes no account. Many activities that do generate GDP, including resource extraction, commercial development, industrial processes, mass transport networks, intensive farming, etc., would quickly destroy that value if they were allowed to take place.

Industrial farming in the well-watered plains of northern Europe is highly productive, provided you don’t look too closely at its energy, transport and environmental costs. It “adds value” in a lengthy supply chain embracing truckers, processors, packers, wholesalers, advertisers, retailers and their many support industries, including bankers, lawyers and accountants, with the effect that the amount of added value greatly exceeds the cash value of the production itself. Small scale “peasant” and part-time farming, on the other hand, whether on Greek islands, in the Italian south, the foothills of the Pyrenees or elsewhere, operates within local, sometimes cashless, supply chains, with low inputs and limited overheads, where little –  if any – value added is recorded.

Because GDP attaches to market prices rather than underlying value, it overvalues life in the fast lane while undervaluing its less frenetic alternatives. Whereas, at one end of the tourist spectrum, people visit cities such as London, Paris, Berlin and Munich largely on account of the GDP-intensive spending opportunities they offer, it is the unintensive, GDP-light approach to life in parts of southern Europe that makes people want to spend time there.

This is not, however, only a north- south issue. There are plenty of small-scale farms, and many beautiful tourist spots, in northern Europe, just as Mediterranean Europe is home to cutting-edge industries and technologies. GDP exaggerates the value-added of material, high-input activities wherever they take place, rising too quickly when they prosper in money terms and falling too far when they slow down. At the same time it underestimates the value of all low-input activities, whether in a family’s vegetable garden on Crete or a contemporary music studio in Amsterdam.

The result is to over-emphasise the differences in money wealth across Europe and, because GDP dictates its governance, to cause Eurozone policy to exacerbate those differences rather than work to reduce them. By imposing a set of policy reforms this has made life for the Euro much harder than it need have been, while also driving intra-EU migration to a level at which it risks becoming socially divisive. In these ways a project founded in the principal of convergence has had the opposite effect, because it has failed to embrace the diversity that the term “wealth” comprehends.

Much depends on the purpose of the Eurozone project. It was conceived as a political construct to demonstrate in a highly tangible and theoretically irrevocable way the ever-closer union upon which the E.U. (pace the United kingdom) is predicated. The politicians, however, were too quick to give control of their creation to a group of technocrats for whom “money” is absolute and apolitical, so that the political question of what that money represents was never raised.

The result is that what is axiomatic for central bankers – that wealth is proportionate to the quantity of sound money circulating in the economy – has now become an inalienable political fact across a

continent in which wealth means different things to different people in different places. For some it means the survival of a community or landscape or way of life; for others it means escape from the horrors of fratricidal war; for yet others affordable housing, or accessible healthcare, or the opportunity to perform worthwhile work. For the Eurozone, however, it just means the money transactions that GDP measures – transactions that tend to make the rich richer while everybody else struggles to keep up. 

To reverse this self-defeating, undemocratic process, challenge to GDP and its governance impacts is needed from European citizens of all walks of life. If you are against many of the policies currently adopted by the EU leadership (from austerity to the privatisation of public resources, international trade agreements, longer working hours and corporate-friendly reforms), you have a stake in demolishing the political power of GDP. With a different system to measure prosperity and success, the demands of civil society would finally become influential for economic governance. Ultimately, a different set of values and goals would make Europe better positioned to adopt rules that increase the wellbeing of all its citizens, rather than pockets of a few.